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Emancipatory economic deglobalisation:
a Polanyian perspective
Desglobalização econômica emancipatória:
uma perspectiva a partir de Polanyi
Andreas Novy
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna, Austria
A b s t r a c t :  The article explores the potential of a Polanyian analysis for overcoming the current 
Manichean opposition between cosmopolitan globalizers and reactionary nationalists. For long, Karl 
Polanyi has inspired socio-economic thinking in different ways. First, his reflections on the end of the first 
period of globalization in the 1930s offer insights for analysing the current political-economic situation. 
Furthermore, Polanyi contributes to an institutional analysis and utopian thinking towards a civilization 
for all. His approach enables a combination of a critique of current neoliberal globalization as a renewed 
version of the “liberal utopia” with a cultural and ecological critique of capitalism as a mode of production 
and living. In this respect, Karl Polanyi may be contrasted to Friedrich Hayek, both contemporaries of Red 
Vienna, an ambitious project of local socialism as a step towards a “good life for all”. The social and cultural 
struggles in Vienna during the 1920s and 1930s offer insights for current confrontations worldwide, but 
especially in Brazil where the reformist attempts of civilizing capitalism where confronted with severe 
opposition. Instead of the false polarization between globalization and nationalism, policies “for the select 
few” are opposed to policies” for all”. Finally, Polanyi s´ reflections will be used to shed light onto the 
current impasse resulting from the illegitimate deposition of president Dilma Rousseff.
K e y w o r d s :  deglobalisation; Polanyi; liberal utopia; market societies; Red Vienna.
r e s u m o :  O artigo explora o potencial de uma análise baseada em Polanyi para superar a atual oposição 
maniqueísta entre globalizadores cosmopolitas e nacionalistas reacionários. Por muito tempo, Karl Polanyi 
tem inspirado o pensamento socioeconômico atual de diferentes maneiras. Em primeiro lugar, suas reflexões 
do final do primeiro período de globalização, na década de 1930, oferecem elementos para a análise da atual 
situação político-econômica. Além disso, Polanyi contribui para uma análise institucional e um pensamento 
utópico em torno de uma civilização para todos. Sua abordagem permite uma combinação de uma crítica da 
globalização neoliberal atual como uma versão renovada da “utopia liberal” com uma crítica cultural e ecológica 
do capitalismo como modo de produção e de vida. Nessa direção, Karl Polanyi pode ser contrastado a Friedrich 
Hayek, ambos contemporâneos da chamada Red Vienna, um ambicioso projeto de socialismo local como um 
passo em direção a uma “vida boa para todos”. Aclamado por Polanyi, tal projeto foi contestado por Hayek, o 
qual se tornaria, mais tarde, um dos principais idealizadores do neoliberalismo. As lutas sociais e culturais em 
Viena durante as décadas de 1920 e 1930 oferecem insights para os confrontos atuais em todo o mundo, mas 
especialmente no Brasil, onde as tentativas reformistas de civilizar o capitalismo foram confrontadas por uma 
oposição severa. Em vez da falsa polarização entre globalização e nacionalismo, as políticas “para os poucos 
selecionados” se opõem às políticas “para todos”. Finalmente, as reflexões de Polanyi são usadas para lançar luz 
sobre o atual impasse resultante da deposição ilegítima da presidenta Dilma Rousseff.
P a l a v r a s - c h a v e :  desglobalização; Polanyi; utopia liberal; sociedades de mercado; Red 
Vienna.
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For decades, the struggle against neoliberalism and finance capitalism has been 
at centre stage in political debate (HARVEY, 2005). Over the last years, however, 
it has increasingly been overshadowed by a broad variety of reactionary movements. 
Secure pillars of western civilization have been questioned by an authoritarian turn 
as well as shifts towards post-truth politics. Therefore, the current political and 
economic situation is increasingly perceived as a complex and threatening turmoil. 
From Hungary to Turkey, from Brazil to Japan, there is a clear trend towards 
authoritarianism, controlled and illiberal democracy, in some cases even dictatorships 
– while neoliberalism seems to be well alive, using crises for its rejuvenation (PECK, 
2013). In this article, the oeuvre of Karl Polanyi, born 1886 in Vienna, a Hungarian-
Austrian intellectual who died in Canada in 19641, will be re-read to grasp the deep 
ongoing changes which share systematic similarities with the transformations of 
the 1930s – an epoch in which the rise of fascism and communism went hand in 
hand with the decline of liberalism and its illusionary economic policies. The key 
objective of this article is to reflect on the liberal illusion of borderless globalization 
and to problematize the dominant narrative of a civilizational confrontation between 
globalizers and patriots – most recently Macron against Le Pen -, the latter framed 
once again as the “new barbarians” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 7). 
This article is structured in four sections. Section 1 presents three readings of 
Polanyi which offer multiple, but intertwined perspectives for a better understanding 
of today s´ challenges and potentials. First, for most of his career Polanyi was not an 
academic, but an autodidactic analyst of capitalism with a deep interest in reformist 
policies. His broad economic analyses enrich a post-disciplinary political and cultural 
framework in line with Cultural Political Economy (SUM; JESSOP, 2013, p. 483). 
Second, he had the deep ethical and political conviction that capitalist market 
societies which impose economic imperatives on politics and thereby disrupt society 
are neither functional nor desirable socio-economic systems. As an anthropologist 
and institutionalist economist he was, therefore, interested in the variety of non-
market economic systems in which the economy is embedded in society. Third, 
Polanyi criticized the liberal utopia of self-regulating markets and a minimal state as 
illusory and offered a specific utopia “for all”. Polanyi s´ reformist and revolutionary 
concerns can best be grasped by – what is called – the “hard” Polanyi and synthesized 
by the concept of double transformation which link short-term reformist struggles to 
overcome neoliberalism with the long-term cultural, social and political revolution 
to overcome capitalism (KLEIN, 2014, p. 104ff). Section 2 is inspired by a Polanyian 
analysis of the deep crisis of capitalism caused by market fundamentalism which 
he strongly perceived as a cultural crisis of a sense of belonging in a market society 
dominated by materialist objectives and widespread social insecurity. Current 
globalisation of a market society is unique in depth and scope (DICKEN, 2015), but 
has nevertheless systematic similarities to the world order before 1929. Both are auto-
destructive forms of global capitalism that provoke political countermovements. 
Will the second globalization of the 21st century avoid the mistakes of the first one 
in the 19th century? Crucial would be the perception that the current political and 
cultural dispute is not between globalizers and nationalists, but between those – like 
Friedrich A. Hayek – favouring a civilization for the few based on a strong state – 
and those who – like Karl Polanyi – aspire “freedom for all”. Interwar Red Vienna 
– an outstanding experiment in local socialism in interwar Europe – is taken as an 
1 Not only has there been 
released an outstanding 
biography by Gareth Dale 
(2016a), the German discus-
sion on climate change has 
been strongly influenced 
by a report that borrowed 
Polanyi´s key concept – The 
Great Transformation – to 
demonstrate the secular 
challenge posed by the 
current socioecological 
transformation (WBGU, 
2011).
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emblematic case to show what is at stake in such a cultural and political dispute, a 
confrontation that was recently repeated in Brazil. Section 3 presents the concrete 
utopia of a “good life for all” which is inspired by Bloch (1959, p. 2), for whom 
thinking means transcending, perceiving the new as also implicit in the existing. But 
the “good life for all” is also inspired by Karl Polanyi and his reflections on “freedom 
for all” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 265). The proposed concrete utopia, therefore, 
does not pretend to be a universally valid utopia, but exposes strategic inferences for 
an emancipatory countermovement here and now. It proposes democratic multi-level 
territorialization strategies to enable place-based experiments with social ecological 
institutions and infrastructures. The article ends with a short post-script on Brazil. 
Whereas the article is based on Gramsci s´ pessimism of the intellect, this final section 
is inspired by the optimism of the will of empowerment from below – a trace of 
Brazilian culture which must not be underestimated (NOVY, 2002).
THREE READINGS OF POLANyI – AND A METHOD
To be sure, neither Polanyi s´ analyses nor his forecasts were without flaws2. 
Therefore, there is no comprehensive Polanyian theory or superior prognostics. But 
Karl Polanyi offers something different and highly relevant in the current crisis of 
neoliberal globalisation: In a proto-type of cultural political economy his analysis 
relates the economic and the extra-economic (SUM; JESSOP, 2013, p. 67), thereby 
widening our horizon beyond the liberal individualistic Zeitgeist which dominates 
the worldview of the cosmopolitan elite. He offers a socioeconomic research program 
to understand the link between culture, nature, space, politics and economics3. 
The three readings of Polanyi as a socioeconomist, exposed on the following pages, 
although presented sequentially, have to be undertaken together to grasp their full 
potential.
Understanding capitalist market societies
To begin with, the revival of Karl Polanyi is strongly linked to the financial crisis 
of 2008 and the apparent disaster of “market fundamentalism” (BLOCK; SOMERS, 
2014). Indeed, the analogy between the current crisis and the 1930s is striking. 
Reading Polanyi s´ analysis of the 1920s and 1930s, the discursive similarities are 
impressive. No surprise that, after 2008, many re-cited the famous quote from The 
Great Transformation: 
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an 
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed 
his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 3). 
Optimists assumed that the financial crisis marked the end of neoliberal 
globalization, thereby underestimating neoliberalisation as a class project which 
uses crises to rejuventate (HARVEY, 2005; PECK, 2013). Indeed, the longevity 
2 He erred on important 
issues, from the Moscow 
trials in the 1920s to his 
prediction on the end of 
market societies in the 
1940s which was based on 
“equating capitalism with 
laissez-faire liberalism” and 
thereby underestimating 
the sustainability of regu-
lated capitalism (DALE, 
2016b, p. 122ff).
3 “Where Karl departs from 
the conventional Marxist 
analysis is in his insistence 
on cultural degradation as 
the ultimate evil of capi-
talism, as distinct from mere 
economic exploitation” 
(POLANYI LEVITT, 1990, p. 
123).
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of neoliberalism and the dominant position of internationally mobile – apparently 
transnational – capital is somehow similar to haute finance s´ project during the 
Hundred Years`  Peace before 1914 (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 10). 
However, after 2008, the worst mistakes of the 1930s with respect to economic 
policy making were not repeated. Vigorous Keynesian interventions “rescued” 
finance capital, avoided a financial meltdown – and “saved time” (STREECK, 2013). 
The costs of saving banks, wealth and finance capital were shifted to the taxpayer. 
The resultant increase in public debt further strengthened the tiny minority of the 
hyper-wealthy rentiers, who have been the main beneficiaries of financial deregulation 
(MILANOVIC, 2016, p. 44.199-205). Evidence spreads that we witness “the end 
of normal” (GALBRAITH, 2014), with clear catastrophic overtones (STREECK, 
2016). Polanyi s´ narrative of the interwar political economy adds to the interpretations 
offered by Keynes and Marxists on underconsumption, overaccumulation and 
imperialist competition (SWEEZY, 1959; KEYNES, 1964) by illustrating the erosion 
of socio-cultural cohesion and the power of ideology. The stubborn and fanatic faith 
in markets as natural justified severe political intervention with sometimes disastrous 
consequences (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 141). This broadly shared faith of the elite 
resembles a dispositive, a persistent “strategic alignment between the semantic and 
material features of an apparatus” (SUM; JESSOP, 2013, p. 113). What Polanyi 
analysed with respect to the League of Nations applies to the Troika as a discursive-
material apparatus too: “Had the aim not been intrinsically impossible, it would 
have been surely attained, so able, sustained, and single-minded was the attempt” 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 240).
Today, the rise of different types of reactionary right-wing movements all over 
the world can profit from a further issue dear to Polanyi. In fact, it was his original 
concern to understand “the breakdown of our civilization” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], 
p. 5) which made fascism possible. Up to The Great Transformation Polanyi s´ interest 
with long-term historical events was instrumental4, based on a key assumption: “In 
order to comprehend German fascism one has to go back to Ricardian England” 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 32). According to Polanyi, it is the specific, highly 
complex form of metamorphosis to an industrial society which made laissez-faire 
liberalism an illusory ideology and fascism a potentially powerful response to inherent 
problems of a self-regulating market.
Exploring worlds beyond market societies
Already in the 1970s and 1980s, Polanyi (1977) was rediscovered as a critic of 
market-centered formalist economics. He favoured a substantive and institutionalist 
understanding of economics as socioeconomics. This reading is of crucial importance 
in a redefinition of economics as a field of social sciences, sensitive to bio-physical 
limits, politics and culture (SUM; JESSOP 2013; SPASH, 2017). After World War 
II, Polanyi´ s hope rested on a world order based on regional cooperation. Once 
the cold war was installed and the McCarthy era repressed free thinking in the 
USA, Polanyi substituted his short-term concern for the post-war economic order 
and turned to historical and anthropological research. He became increasingly 
interested in history and geography – other places at other times. His research in 
North America after 1945 aimed at discovering institutional arrangements different 
4 Only after World War 
II, Polanyi became deeply 
interested in history and 
anthropology in itself.
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from the current market-centered model (POLANYI LEVITT, 1990, p. 116). In his 
anthropological studies he showed that the current market economy is a unique – 
historically specific - way of organizing the livelihood (DALE, 2016b). There was a 
diversity of economies before the current market economy, which all had a common 
denominator: The economy was time-place specific, regulated by diverse institutions 
and embedded in society and nature. 
Already in The Great Transformation, he described the metamorphosis from 
an agrarian to an industrial society as a profound institutional change. “The 
transformation to this system from the earlier economy is so complete that it 
resembles more the metamorphosis of the caterpillar than any alteration that can be 
expressed in terms of continuous growth and development” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], 
p. 44). If one can show that the current socio-economic model emerged out of deep 
societal changes which went hand in hand with the installation of a fossil fuel based 
energy system, then one can assume that this model will not be the end of history. 
Socioeconomics is open to the new, it transcend the actually existing. In line with 
critical realism, Polanyian socioeconomics assumes that the potential is part of reality 
– therefore, utopian thinking is not non-scientific, but is, explicitly or implicitly, 
guiding economic thinking and policy making. 
Utopian thinking for a civilization for all
This leads to a third reading of Polanyi on the importance of utopias, as they 
shape consciousness and, thereby, reality. Of foremost importance was his critique of 
the then dominant liberal utopia which was an ideological orientation that inspired 
19th century thinking and policy making. He showed a unique awareness that this 
laissez-faire ideology – which at that time was a genuinely right-wing philosophy - does 
not only lead to economic crisis and political disaster, as Marxist crisis theory as well 
as Keynes´  insights predict. He perceived the ecological and cultural disintegration 
caused by a weak state and universalizing market transactions as a fatal threat to order 
and civilization. Karl Polanyi was a left thinker, but skeptical of equating material 
improvement with civilizational progress. He insisted on the need of “habitation” – 
today we would say well-being or buen vivir - instead of mere “improvement” – the 
good old progress and growth ideology. He, thereby, was sympathetic to grounding 
utopian hope in “Heimat”, homeland (BLOCH, 1959, p. 1628), the unrealized 
potential of being at home as free and equal inhabitants of this planet. Combining 
progressive with conservative concerns enriches not only the historical analysis of 
the ongoing transformation. It also offers a very different type of concrete utopia. 
Instead of assuming a linear process of progress, development has to be understood 
as a dialectical process of conserving and overcoming existing institutional settings 
and practices (LÖWY; SAYRE, 1993). In the 21st century systemic changes induced 
by ecological constraints will again have to create substantially new institutions 
and social forms (WBGU, 2011). But this ongoing “metamorphosis” (POLANYI, 
2001[1944], p. 44) will have to respect bio-physical limits and preserve certain 
institutions of conviviality, defending it against homogenizing tendencies of market-
centred isomorphism. To elaborate such a utopian horizon of a good life for all will 
have to overcome the simplistic left prioritization of time (as progressive) over space 
(as conservative) (HARVEY, 1996; 2000). 
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Double transformation
The different readings of Polanyi show his realist and utopian, reformist and 
revolutionary, conservative and progressive leanings. Out of his curiosity and 
intellectual sincerity, he often vascillated, sometimes erred. But he always remained 
faithful to his belief that modern societies could be organized in a way that freedom 
for all is possible. Polanyi deconstructed the liberal utopia before World War II 
because he perceived it as inviable. He did not get to know the social market utopia 
which guided the ideas of “welfare for all” based on growth-induced consumerism 
(ERHARD, 1957). Perhaps because of these consumerist leanings of post-war 
prosperity, Polanyi showed very little interest in the social democratic experiments 
during what was later called the “Golden Age of Capitalism”, be it in the form of 
Scandinavian welfare state, Fordist welfare capitalism or the Beveridge-inspired 
British welfare state (DALE, 2016b). However, a “soft” reading of Polanyi which 
defines economic development by cyclical movements of more or less market influence 
is shaped by this political reference (BLOCK; SOMERS, 2014). It was based on the 
conviction of the “always ever embedded market “ and the resultant assumption of a 
natural societal equilibrium - this time based on the post-war consensus of regulated 
market economies in a capitalist world. It assumed as natural and eternal the 
alternation in power between US-democrats and republicans, social democrats and 
conservatives in Europe. It took a democratic state with regulatory powers as given 
and perceived extremes – on the left and the right – as equally threatening to the 
normal state of affairs. In this sense, the current framing of political confrontation 
as a conflict between globalizers and nationalists aims at actualizing “normality” in 
times of turmoil. In the Austrian presidential elections in 2016, for example, this led 
to the paradox situation that the right-wing, reactionary candidate presented himself 
as the “man of change”, while the victorious left-liberal Green party candidate united 
the establishment, the “normal”. 
But neither the “soft” reading of Polanyi nor the social liberal world view of the 
20th century can deal with the above described contradictions. Once the consensus of 
a cooperative, socially cohesive and inclusive field of social and political development 
is revoked by Orban, Erdogan, Trump and others, the struggle about the basic 
orientation of future socioeconomic development intensifies. In this situation, the 
“hard” Karl Polanyi - the way his wife and daughter portrayed his approach (DALE, 
2016b, p. 6f) – seems better suited. The “hard” Polanyi was not interested in simply 
reforming capitalism, as he was aware that “freedom for all” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], 
p. 257ff) was in a democratic way only possible with non-capitalist institutions 
embedded in a nurturing society and sensibly acknowledging the multiple functions 
of nature. Most probably, Polanyi – who was close to many reformists – would 
have sympathized with the concept of a “double transformation” (KLEIN, 2014), 
aiming at overcoming the dualism of reform versus revolution. The concept of a 
“double transformation” describes the twofold challenge of civilizing capitalism by 
overcoming the neoliberal mode of regulation while at the same time taking the first 
steps towards transcending capitalism. This requires strategically selective agency to 
overcome unsustainable social forms of capitalism, especially the growth imperative 
and consumerism (JACKSON, 2017), but also a reductionist understanding of 
politics and the state (NOVY, 2014). The double transformation offers a method that 
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is reformist as well as revolutionary. The guiding ideas of a double transformation, 
as proposed by Klein, consist in redistribution, social-ecological conversion of the 
economy and society, democratic participation and solidarity and peace-building 
(KLEIN, 2014, p. 112). In section three, the good life for all will be presented as such 
a modern left narrative, a green, eco-socialist utopia of a classless civilization that 
permits the flourishing of all its members (NOVY, 2012). 
THE LIBERAL ILLUSION OF BORDERLESS 
GLOBALIzATION
This section is about the reformist moment of the double transformation in an 
age of increasingly authoritarian governance. It will be about broad strategic alliances 
to defend democracy, the rule of law and the welfare state. The argument of this 
section goes against the hegemonic interpretation of current political confrontations. 
Within a Polanyian framework it will be necessary to deconstruct the currently 
dominant interpretation of the political confrontation as a clash between globalizers 
and nationalists, even for defending minimum civilizational standards, not to speak 
about implementing deeper transformations. 
Two waves of globalisation
Trade and finance were increasingly borderless in the first great globalization 
of the 19th century (RODRIK, 2011, p. 24ff). John Stuart Mill, who was an early 
sympathizer with women s´ right (ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 265), but had no 
problem in justifying despotism “as a legitimate mode of government in dealing 
with barbarians” (MILL, 1985, p. 69 apud HOBSBAWM, 2003, p. 33), summarized 
the aspiration of this century: a world, “more improved; more eminent in the best 
characteristics of Man and Society; farther advanced in the road to perfection; 
happier, nobler, wiser”5. The progress of this socio-economic system was made 
possible by the scramble for Africa, colonialism and imperialism (HOBSON, 1968) 
and easy access to fossil fuels. While the divide between the Global North and the 
Global South increased (MILANOVIC, 2016), this belle époche was the paradise for 
the emerging middle and upper classes (HOBSBAWM, 2003, p. 55). Karl Polanyi 
was brought up in Budapest in this apparently stable cosmopolitan environment. Up 
to World War I, his middle-class radical political project was based on “an abstract, 
liberal conception of democracy” (DALE, 2016a, p. 100).
The idea of a borderless self-adjusting market was a powerful social invention 
that led to a hegemonic world view with respect to market globalization as a natural 
and progressive order. Up to the 1930s, it was “hard to find any divergence between 
utterances of Hoover and Lenin, Churchill and Mussolini” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], 
p. 26). Even Polanyi, in the 1920s a renowned journalist for the prestigious Der 
Österreichische Volkswirt in Vienna, remained victim of this Zeitgeist (POLANYI, 
2001[1944], p. 21). Although philosophically a severe critic of Mises and Hayek, he 
himself held a rather naturalist understanding of the market mechanism. “With the 
Austrians and against Keynes, Polanyi believed that the market system relies on self-
5 This resembles Brazilian 
slave owner who had no 
problem in being convicted 
believers of economic liber-
alism and slavery. They 
adhered to Adam Smith´s 
market ideology, but not to 
the thesis that the origin of 
the wealth of nations resides 
in labour. 
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equilibration and that policy interventions generally aggravate market instability” 
(DALE, 2016b, p. 104). So he himself is included, when Polanyi asserts that “[h]
ardly anyone understood the political function of the international monetary system. 
[…] To liberal economists the gold standard was a purely economic institution; they 
refused even to consider it as a part of a social mechanism” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], 
p. 21). “The only equilibrium liberal economic theory recognized was a worldwide 
one. But in practice this model was inadequate” (HOBSBAWM, 2003, p. 41), as it 
did not grasp that the state is a crucial capitalist institution. But markets, capital and 
the state have developed hand in hand (MARX, 1986, chap. 24; WALLERSTEIN, 
1995).
From the 1870s onwards the market continued to expand, “but this movement 
was met by a countermovement” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 136): Economic 
liberalism “aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market” on the one 
hand, social protection “aiming at the conservation of man and nature” on the other 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 138)6. This has inspired Block and Somers to see the 
original contribution of Polanyi in insisting that a market society cannot exist without 
institutional embedding. It is correct that we have to understand capitalism as an 
“always-embedded market economy” (BLOCK; SOMERS, 2014, p. 96). But such a 
reading reduces the double movement to a “self-equilibrating mechanism” (DALE, 
2016b, p. 4), balancing societal swings from more to less market, globalization, 
privatization and liberalization. This “soft” reading underestimates that this process 
has always been asymmetrical with a strategic selectivity of interventions being 
functional to capitalist reproduction. Given the control of the means of production 
and in general also the means of sense-making via commercial media, there is an 
“asymmetrical configuration of constraints and opportunities on social forces as they 
pursue particular projects” (SUM; JESSOP, 2013, p. 214). Political groups, linked 
to dominant class interests, can impose strategies which might have destructive 
consequences for broader sectors of society. In the 19th century, strategic selectivity 
led to a specific mix of deregulation and regulation of markets. “Laissez-faire was 
planned; planning was not” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 147). Markets continued 
to be viewed as natural, planning as artificial, but unavoidable to sustain the socio-
economic system. While, in principle, the economic and political sphere should be 
clearly separated, protectionism and colonialism were deliberately used to improve 
national competitiveness. The liberal utopia that “economic society was subject to 
laws which were not human laws” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 131) was defended 
against all evidence to the contrary, independent of real economic dynamics of state-
market entanglements. 
The interwar conjuncture differed from the pre-war situation, as most European 
countries became democracies in the 1920s, thereby empowering working and middle 
class claims for social protection by the state. In the 1930s, as a result of economic 
slump and political turmoil, governments produced – some on purpose, others 
unintentionally - weakened and unresponsive democracies that “are most vulnerable 
to attack by extremist leaders bent on imposing authoritarian solutions” (BLOCK; 
SOMERS, 2014, p. 35)7. Laissez-faire utopia, this “anarchism of the bourgeoisie” 
which “had no place for the state” (HOBSBAWM, 2003, p. 40) vanished in the 
big depression. Hand in hand, democracies were dismantled, Red Vienna being an 
emblematic case. 
6 Hayek even interpreted 
this countermovement 
as dominant, perceiving 
a decline of liberal values 
from the 1950s onwards.
7 The stubbornness with 
which economic liberals, 
for a critical decade, had, in 
the service of deflationary 
policies, supported author-
itarian interventionism, 
merely resulted in a decisive 
weakening of the demo-
cratic forces which might 
otherwise have averted 
the fascist catastrophe” 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 
242). “Germany reaped the 
advantages of those who 
help to kill that which is 
doomed to die” (POLANYI, 
2001[1944], p. 254).
Emancipatory Economic dEglobalisation: a polanyian pErspEctivE
5 6 2 Rev. BRas. estud. uRBanos Reg. (onLIne), ReCIFe, v.19, n.3, p.554-575, set-deZ. 2017
As a consequence, a variety of illiberal national regimes implemented a 
deglobalisation agenda based on currency depreciation, trade wars and rearmament. 
Polanyi perceived fascism and socialism as two types of countermovement against 
the liberal mainstream – both “representing the possible in opposition to that which 
is impossible” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 259). The defeat of fascism and a long 
war changed the relation of forces to the advantage of labour and against economic 
liberalism. The post-World War II order was a window of opportunity of a broad 
anti-fascist consensus based on building a civilization for all. A strong labour 
movement and the existence of the Soviet Union contributed to civilizing Western 
capitalism by institutionalizing social citizenship in the national power containers. 
With the decline of trade unions and the collapse of the Soviet Union, capital 
reassured its dominance, reigning today again without systemic alternative. The 
return of liberal ideology has been prepared since the 1940s, more systematically 
from the 1960s onwards. Appropriating important elements of left critique of 
the welfare state – especially its bureaucratic and paternalist traces – liberalism 
has become hegemonic on the political right and left. Economically, over the last 
decades, the neoliberal straitjacket of borderless financial markets and liberal trade 
regimes has fostered the centralization of capital, increased inequality and put 
severe stress on emancipatory territorialized strategies. The contradiction between 
capitalism and democracy has deepened (BOWLES; GINTIS, 1986), while in 
this emerging order of unregulated foreign trade and global financial markets, the 
power of political actors is limited in general, but especially in opposing interests 
of global capital and the wealthy (STREECK, 2013, p. 159). Not only at the end of 
the nineteenth century, due to regulatory isonomy and institutional isomorphism 
“the peoples of the world were institutionally standardized to a degree unknown 
before” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 261). 
Two types of deglobalisation
The history of capitalist globalization shows that there is not a linear process 
of increasing planetary integration, but a dialectic movement of contradictory 
tendencies. As there have been two waves of globalization, there have been different 
types of countermovement against globalization8. The liberal Harvard economist 
Dani Rodrik (2011, p. 200) postulates a globalization trilemma insisting that “[w]
e cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-determination all at 
one”. As described in section 2.1., the straightjacket of the Gold standard in the 
interwar period sacrificed democracy. The Bretton Woods-system (1944-1973) 
limited globalization, especially global financial markets and free floating currencies, 
organizing democracy in the national container. The liberal hyper-globalization 
utopia after 1989 was global governance based on the hollowing out of the nation 
state and the invention of global democracy. Until very recently, this liberal vision has 
shaped values, institutions and public opinion. 
Hartmut Rosa (2016, p. 671ff) has analysed capitalist globalization as driven by 
“dynamic stabilization” and the resultant modernist process of increasing opportunities 
via the global extension of the reach of relations (Weltreichweitenvergrößerung). The more 
options the better; the quicker the satisfaction of needs, the more needs can be satisfied. 
More, bigger, quicker is the imperative of dynamic stabilization. Money is the best 
8 Fascism and socialism being 
the most important ones in 
the 1930s, including bellig-
erent forms of protectionism 
and reactionary experiments 
with autarky.
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possible tool to extend ones potential. The ideal of autonomous individuals, endowed 
with sufficient money, acting as free and equal agents in a borderless market society 
has become a widespread ideal – with supporters from diverse ideological camps. This 
tends to reinforce consumerism and neoliberal globalisation has aimed at artificially 
creating markets for nearly everything, commodifying nature and knowledge being 
the most recent effort of market engineering (BURAWOY, 2015). The resultant 
political polarization, social stress and cultural disintegration have been systematically 
neglected and underestimated (WILKINSON; PICKETT, 2010). But as egoistic gain-
maximization cannot be limited to market agency, it will use all political and military 
means to be successful. This explains the attractiveness of nationalism, economic and 
non-economic strategies of outcompeting the “others” by legal or not so legal means. 
Organized crime – as long as it has not transformed itself into prestigious business – is 
just an illegal form of taking advantage. “And if the smug pride of the successful is often 
intolerable and offensive, the belief that success depends wholly on him is probably the 
pragmatically most effective incentive to successful action” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 83). 
Berlusconi innovated as a role model for successful political entrepreneurs, Trump 
radicalizes the ideal of the self-made man who uses all economic and non-economic, 
legal and not so legal means to be successful. 
But the legitimacy of global governance is also questioned by geoeconomic and 
geopolitical changes in the Global North and South. On the one hand, the colonial 
attitude of “humanitarian interventions” in the tradition of Mill (WALLERSTEIN, 
2007), double standards with respect to trade (CHANG, 2002) or uneven 
responsibility for ecological problems – it all systematically violates principles of 
equality. Nevertheless, the economic power of the rising Global South is challenging 
the supremacy of the West and demanding equal share in global wealth and resource 
depletion. On the other hand, the citizenship premium of being member of a 
rich society is still substantial (MILANOVIC, 2016, p. 133), apparently offering 
competitive advantages to groups which are real or potential looser of further 
economic globalization – the European periphery and the US-rust belt being two 
examples. The resistance to globalization by the systemic looser can take more or less 
rational and more or less ethical directions: From opposing austerity and the power 
of corporations to strategies of limiting immigration and the use of military power.
Following Polanyi, the current heated disputes between cosmopolitans and 
nationalists on issues like refugees, the Euro or Brexit are profoundly flawed. 
Capitalism as a socio-economic system based on universal self-regulating exchange of 
money, commodities, services and persons is compatible with fair play and peaceful 
conviviality only under very benevolent conditions. High growth rates – as obtained 
under welfare capitalism – for example are crucial for permitting win-win solutions. 
Signals of the end of this type of globalization prevail and the trend of imposing 
selective, often one-sided limits on globalization in its multiple forms is gaining 
momentum. In such a situation, pleas for “enlightened self interest” to introduce 
“global social rights” (LESSENICH, 2016, p. 188, 195) or a global inheritance 
tax to finance a basic income are raised (ROSA, 2016, p. 729f) by defender of 
cosmopolitism. But the real political dynamic is going in a very different direction. 
Evidence suggests that confrontations of the years to come will most probably be 
about shaping diverging types of deglobalisation, territorial sovereignty and an 
increased role of the state: More or less trade and migration will then result from 
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territory-specific political decision making with very different outcomes. The strategic 
choice will most probably be between two alternatives: (1) a strategy of competitive 
deglobalisation with imperialist overtones imposed by the strong and (2) a strategy 
of democratically coordinated deglobalisation which at the same time intensifies 
international cooperation in solving contemporary global policy challenges. 
On the one side, reactionary, belligerent countermovements have been 
spreading, the Tea Party in the USA (BLOCK; SOMERS, 2014, p. 193ff), right 
wing populism in Europe. Reactionary deglobalisation is authoritarian, ethno-
nationalist and exclusionary. At the same time, these reactionary movements adhere 
to many principles of neoliberalism and embrace economic globalization, but only if 
it strengthens their respective market position and purchasing power. It is interesting 
that these reactionary movements more or less openly question climate change, as it 
would make basic tenets of their political and cultural program impossible. None of 
them embraces a minimal state, many favour a strong authoritarian state.
On the other side, Polanyi, Keynes (1933) and Rodrik have for long acknowledged 
the danger of beggar-thy-neighbour export orientation and globalized monetary 
regimes. Selectively dismantling this global framework is a reformist project 
which will permit “to tolerate willingly that other nations shape their domestic 
institutions according to their inclinations” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 262). This 
would contribute to “a regionalized world of coexistence of different economic and 
social systems“ (POLANYI LEVITT, 2013, p. 92). Rodrik insists on overcoming 
hyperglobalisation and proposes the return to the more successful strategy of 
legitimizing globalization “from below” in line with the Bretton Woods tradition. 
[W]e can and should tell a different story about globalization. Instead of viewing it as 
a system that requires a single set of institutions or one principal economic superpower, 
we should accept it as a collection of diverse nations whose interactions are regulated by 
a thin layer of simple, transparent, and commonsense traffic rules [...] What it will do 
is to enable a healthy, sustainable world economy that leaves room for democracies to 
determine their own futures (RODRIK, 2011, p. 280).
Selective economic deglobalisation is not an objective in itself, but a necessary 
first moment of the double transformation, a means of levelling the political playing 
field and avoiding the worst combination of hyperglobalisation without democracy. 
Achieving this reformist objective requires broad alliances of the “many” who 
suffer from increasing centralization of economic power as well as increasing non-
democratic control of political power. Against centralized economic power, territorial 
and place-based alliances against universal market actors will be crucial. While capital 
is mobile, the mobility of people is restricted politically, but also due to socio-cultural 
reasons. People are attached to places, their families, friends and routines. Capital is 
free of all nostalgic sense of belonging; it has no homeland. This asymmetry with 
respect to mobility has to be countered. Enabling a good life for all requires limiting 
power (BELLO, 2006): The power by the hyper-wealthy to interfere in domestic 
affairs as well as the systemic logic of universal isomorphism produced by universal 
markets and the commodification of everything. Restricting global financial markets, 
rigorous measures against tax havens, strict regulation on corporate ownership and 
binding social and ecological standards in world trade are necessary prerequisites for 
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effective policies to combat social polarization and ecological degradation. Only after 
dismantling excessive concentration of power, the ethical core of cosmopolitanism 
and the Enlightenment tradition can unfold.
But the second moment of the double transformation requires more than 
defending political democracy and civilizational minimum standards. Taking 
sustainability serious, the structurally expansive and accelerating logic of modern 
capitalism not only has to be curtailed, its systemic compulsion has to be overcome. 
Unlimited expansion and acceleration is incompatible with a realistic understanding 
of human beings (SPASH, 2016; ROSA, 2016). Unfortunately, in the modern 
“opportunity society” (BLÜHDORN, 2013, p. 27) a new version of the liberal utopia 
– and the categorical defense of globalization - is present on the political Left and 
Right. Government, power and politics are perceived as hindrance to liberty, even a 
threat to individual rights and freedoms. Place and territory are perceived as merely 
limiting and restricting. In the words of Michel Houllebecq (apud ROSANVALLON, 
2013, p. 278), “France is a hotel, nothing more”. But in a finite world, place matters 
and there are limits to improvement, growth and acceleration. Neither are property 
rights or a basic income “unconditional”, nor can a “borderless” universal market 
organize freedom in a complex society. Limiting the “unconditional” aspirations for 
freedom as well as regulating “borderless” mobility of commodities, esp. “fictitious” 
commodities like money and labour, is indispensable to guarantee reciprocity not 
only in exchange, but also in involvement (ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 271).
To put it in a nutshell, globalization is spreading in ever more diverse networks, 
technologies and consumption pattern. But this is not a process “up there”, centrally 
managed by international conferences and agreements. It is rooted in everyday life, 
in places and territories. And their responses, their “countermovements” make a 
difference, as they create emancipatory or reactionary accommodations. Therefore, 
the ethical and strategic preference for the global scale in solving global problems – 
climate change, hunger and refugees - has to be overcome. Is it utopian or illusory 
to call for the implementation of “global social rights” or a “global inheritance 
tax”? Polanyi would have identified such strategies as contemporary outflows of the 
liberal laissez-faire utopia, while insinuating that they are illusionary, impossible 
to achieve in a capitalist world economy based on “borderless” economic and 
territorial competition. Instead of insisting in solving global problems at the global 
level, the advantages of more complex strategies of “multispatial metagovernance” 
have to be acknowledged (MARTINELLI; MOULAERT; NOVY, 2013; JESSOP, 
2016). Regaining territorial space of manoeuvre must not be reduced to national 
sovereignty, as diversity-prone economic policies require a multi-scalar strategy of 
increasing spaces of manoeuvre wheresoever possible. Although progressive change 
of European Economic Governance seems remote and regaining national sovereignty 
in Europe might awake ghosts of the past, emancipatory regionalization has to use 
transformative potential at all levels – from the local and regional to the national 
and supranational. Acknowledging the liberal laissez-faire utopia as illusory, does a 
concrete utopia exist that can lead emancipatory strategies and policies here and now? 
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THE GOOD LIFE FOR ALL
This section dwells on the revolutionary moment of the double transformation, 
which requires an emancipatory hegemony which – in the discursive field – is built 
“through p´roblematization ,´ that is, the identification of certain problems, often in 
response to urgencies, around which intellectuals (among others) elaborate a problem, 
its solution, truth regimes and social practices” (SUM; JESSOP, 2013, p. 202). 
Climate change, the rise of a reactionary Right as well as the current geo-economic 
reordering are such urgencies that imply positive and negative potentialities, as the 
contemporary conflict about who is enabled to lead a good life radicalizes: only 
the Global North, the wealthy and the powerful few? Confronting Karl Polanyi 
and Friedrich A. Hayek, contemporaries of interwar Red Vienna, will deepen the 
understanding of the real challenges to be faced.
Polanyi versus Hayek: a civilization for the few or for all?
At the beginning of the 20th century, European societies were still characterized 
by deep class cleavages similar to the “social apartheid” characteristic of a range of 
developing countries today. Until the first world war, inequalities in wealth and 
income, resembled the current Brazilian structure of inequality (PIKETTY, 2014). 
The first world war as well as the emergence of the Soviet Union changed the power 
relations in favour of the working class. From 1918 onwards, political democracy and 
an incipient welfare state were implemented in many European countries, including 
Austria. Social democracy became a decisive political actor which governed the 
city from 1919 to 1934, experimenting with local socialism in diverse policy fields. 
Due to its innovativeness and effectiveness in transforming “workers into citizens”, 
Red Vienna became a world-renowned best practice example for progressive urban 
government (ÖHLINGER, 1993).
Karl Polanyi and Friedrich A. Hayek were both impressed by Red Vienna - 
for the one an example of embedding the economy, for the other a step towards 
serfdom (PECK, 2008, p. 9). In Vienna in the interwar period, social democracy, 
an internationalist movement, unable to gain power nationally, concentrated on 
implementing local socialism9. From 1919 to 1934 it held the absolute majority in 
municipal elections, allowing to implement its programme without coalition partner. 
Red Vienna was a progressive countermovement in the Polanyian sense, aiming at an 
inclusive civilizational model. A social ecological infrastructure of public facilities and 
universal access to high-quality social services and cultural activities were financed 
via progressive taxation. As “consumerism for all” – the social democratic policy 
of post-war welfare capitalism which put it in systematic conflict with ecological 
concerns – was impossible due to the straightjacket of the gold standard, policies 
concentrated on an alternative hegemonic project of popular livelihood based on 
commonality and solidarity. The new spirit of freedom was perceivable in new gender 
roles, alternative modes of teaching and social assistance and a flourishing popular 
culture. It opened the amenities of the city to all its inhabitants: Public housing 
permitting a dignified life, creating a private sphere in a communal context, in 
contrast to precarious tenement.
9 Similar to left parties 
in Uruquay and Brazil in 
the 1990s (PARTIDO DOS 
TRABALHADORES, 1991; 
BECKER, 2003).
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So far, most civilizations restricted social and cultural progress to a selected 
segment of society. In ancient Greece, for example, for the free propertied citizenry, 
while women, slaves and foreigners were excluded in various ways. In fact, with few 
exceptions10, all civilizations were class societies based on hereditary social hierarchies. 
From the French Revolution onwards, diverse social innovations have tried to create 
civilizations for all, not only the select few. Red Vienna was such an experiment: 
While social democrats wanted to extend citizenship by democratic means from civic 
and political to social citizenship, its opponents sacrificed civic and political rights 
to avoid social citizenship for all. But it was also a cultural, unconsciously ecological 
struggle over use value in the city11, about a form of life that can potentially be 
universalized, applicable to all: Taxing the wealthy to finance public housing was the 
most effective measure of fostering social cohesion. “Though restriction applies to all, 
the privileged tend to resent it, as if it were directed solely against themselves. They 
talk of slavery, while in effect only an extension to the others of the vested freedom 
they themselves enjoy is intended” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 262f). Implementing 
the Enlightenment values of freedom, equality and solidarity seemed scandalous 
to many of the better off. Red Vienna was implemented against fierce resistance of 
the privileged minority, denounced as “city hall dictatorship” and “tax and finance 
terrorism” (WASSERMANN, 2014, p. 2). It was destroyed politically in a short civil 
war, leading to a “brain drain that resulted from the persecution, emigration, and 
murder” (WASSERMANN, 2014, p. 3). Economically this place-based experiment 
was defeated by the straightjacket of fiscal austerity and the gold standard (BECKER; 
NOVY, 1999).
Polanyi and Hayek offer diverging interpretations of this experiment. “Both 
thinkers identified the late nineteenth century as the onset of liberalism s´ political, 
economic and intellectual decline, and both viewed the interwar corporatist shift 
in economic policymaking as propitious to, if not direct evidence of, a transition 
to socialism. This was a leitmotif in The Great Transformation and in The Road to 
Serfdom” (DALE, 2016b, p. 109). For Polanyi (2001[1944], p. 299), “Vienna achieved 
one of the most spectacular cultural triumphs of Western history <… and initiated 
an> unexampled moral and intellectual rise in the condition of a highly developed 
industrial working class.” Aiming not only at redistribution, but at restoring 
“habitation” of the proletariat was the locus of a struggle for dignity and freedom 
for all, not the select few.12 “Polanyi, in short, experienced an epiphany akin to that 
which George Orwell described ten years later in Barcelona: suddenly, workers 
´looked you in the face and treated you as an equal´” (DALE, 2016a, p. 100). For 
Polanyi, democracy meant overcoming a servant mentality, social democracy based 
on relational equality and “an expectation of reciprocity, of mutual recognition” 
(ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 261).
There was fierce opposition by large parts of the better-off against the 
democratically elected Viennese government and its intellectuals. University 
and media remained strongholds of “Black Vienna” (WASSERMANN, 2014), 
uniting the Christian-Social party, monarchists and fascist, while isolating left 
intellectuals. Hayek, whose “mind has been shaped by a youth spent in <his> native 
Austria” (HAYEK, 1978, p. vi) was part of this opposition, as he perceived Red 
Vienna as a threat to a tradition of liberty that – according to him - has emerged 
“through more than two thousand years” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 7). While – in his 
10 The ancient Jewish 
communities being, 
according to Veerkamp 
(2012), such an exception. 
11 “Culture is the mode of 
organization of use values” 
(POLANYI LEVITT, 1990, 
p. 115). Cited from Amin 
in “In Praise of Socialism”; 
Monthly Review 1974.
12 While there was a 
cultural struggle on polit-
ical projects in the interwar 
period, after the war the 
question of the good life 
became a technocratic 
problem and was increas-
ingly privatised. Polanyi was 
aware of these tendencies 
in post-war democracy. “´A 
democracy restricted to the 
merely political field ,´ he 
warned, ´is bound to degen-
erate. Its parties become 
a nuisance because they 
absorb the civic energies 
of the people and divert 
them to useless purposes.´” 
(DALE, 2016b, p. 70).
Emancipatory Economic dEglobalisation: a polanyian pErspEctivE
5 6 8 Rev. BRas. estud. uRBanos Reg. (onLIne), ReCIFe, v.19, n.3, p.554-575, set-deZ. 2017
view - ancient Greece and the Renaissance refined our understanding of liberty, 
freedom “has made little progress during the last hundred years and is now on the 
defensive” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 7). 
Polanyi and Hayek both migrated to England which made an imprint on both. 
Hayek insisted on the “tolerance for the existence of a group of idle rich” (HAYEK, 
1978, p. 127), as “inheritance is probably the best means of selection known to 
us” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 128). And he reasoned on the decline of the British Empire 
from the vantage point of nobility and rentiers: “British leadership has gone with 
the disappearance of the class whose style of living the others imitated.” (HAYEK, 
1978, p. 48). Polanyi s´ daughter relates very different experiences from the British 
class society. “I firmly believe that the shock of the passage from Red Vienna to the 
slums of Britain […] burnt into his consciousness – as it did in mine” which explains 
“the passion in the pages of The Great Transformation that accuse the owning classes 
of sacrificing ´Habitation for Improvement´ ´” (POLANYI LEVITT, 1990, p. 123). 
While Polanyi aimed at finally extending the merits of civilization to all, 
Hayek was convinced that civilization has to be based on social hierarchies: “Some 
must lead, and the rest must follow” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 45). Liberty, for Hayek, 
can only exist with servants and subordinates – “with some far ahead of the rest” 
(HAYEK, 1978, p. 43). The end of slavery and the surge of a middle class in the 
20th century, documented in Piketty (2014), was an exceptional period in capitalist 
development – and a threat to Hayek s´ class of the wealthy and their definition of 
liberty. As it is illusory “to assume a society shaped by man s´ will and wish alone” 
(POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 266), liberals have exhaustively exploited an apparent 
dilemma: “If regulation is the only means of spreading and strengthening freedom in 
a complex society, and yet to make use of this means is contrary to freedom per se, 
then such a society cannot be free” (POLANYI, 2001[1944], p. 266). This is Hayek s´ 
simple, simplistic worldview. But it is also totalitarian, as – against all evidence of 
anthropologists and historians – the market is accepted as the only viable economic 
institution. Mixing competition and planning “means that neither will really work” 
(HAYEK, 1944, p. 43). For Hayek, what is permitted is “planning for competition, 
but not […] planning against competition” (HAYEK, 1944, p. 43). This requires the 
constitutional prohibition of all economic institutions but the market. But even this 
market fundamentalism is not sacrosanct, as the embrace of bailout activities over 
the last years have shown. What is sacrosanct is the historically evolved hierarchical 
order which reproduces liberty and flourishing of the few. These totalitarian, anti-
democratic traces of neoliberalism combine well with the current reactionary 
movements, although the latter are based on nationalism, an ideology that Hayek 
does not like (HAYEK, 1978, p. 405). But having to choose between right-wing 
authoritarianism and a civilization for all, Hayek s´ position is clear: As in Red Vienna 
in the 1930s or in Chile in 1973, “it is conceivable that an authoritarian government 
may act on liberal principles” (HAYEK, 1978, p. 103). 
Hayek was not only a fierce opponent of mass societies and unlimited 
government, but also of laissez faire in the sense of a minimal state. For him, liberalism 
requires a strong state that regulates markets. Hayek s´ neoliberalism is more in tune 
with ordoliberalism, acknowledging that the market is the sole efficient economic 
institution. In this sense, Hayek better acknowledged the potential of a return of a 
liberal utopia after the war, if it accepts a strong state. Hayek s´ neoliberalism combines 
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free markets with a strong state for the objective of maintaining a hierarchically 
structured class society.
While neoliberalism and right-wing populism diverge with respect to 
globalization, they share the concern for maintaining the status quo with respect 
to the hierarchy of life chances and options – a civilization for the few. Therefore, 
the current political struggle is against limiting the good life to a select privileged 
group, be it with respect to class position or ethno-national citizenship. If the good 
life is equaled to Western mass consumption, a good life is indeed not possible for 
all. Once, the different types of defenders of the status quo take this for granted 
and arrogantly define the Western life style as non-negotiable they have to take ever 
more radical measures to defend this “imperial mode of living” (BRAND; WISSEN, 
2017). United in the common objective to sustain an unsustainable mode of living, 
a cross-class alliance between reactionary culturalism, climate change denier and 
technocratic neoliberalism might be forged. Orban, Abe and Trump pursue this 
strategy of protecting the status quo via authoritarian, pro-capitalist rule setting, 
serving patriotic sentiments, neglecting environmental concerns, preaching a 
neoliberal work ethos and defending corporate property rights while undermining 
constitutional checks and balances, universal human rights and international law, 
suppressing the autonomy of the judiciary system and civil society. Therefore, a broad 
democratic alliance of the left, liberals and democratic conservatives has to avoid 
civilization regress. This is necessary, but not easy, as neoliberalism has increasingly 
bid farewell to a hegemonic project based on popular support. Instead it has opted 
for a hollowing out of political democracy, in line with authoritarian neoliberalism. 
Producing the Common from below
But authoritarian neoliberalism which imposes a straightjacket of austerity 
on municipalities and regions is not the only future available. Red Vienna was an 
emblematic case: It showed that there is an alternative, although it could not resist 
reactionary destruction. Its struggle and its experiences, however, show what is at 
stake. While Hayek believed in the wisdom of the market, Polanyi had no simple 
answer. First and foremost, he did not fall in the trap of simply opposing the liberal 
worldview: Although neoliberals consider markets and competition as sacrosanct, 
neither the market nor competition should be abolished. Polanyi s´ answer is 
deliberative, as he acknowledges the difficulties to construct freedom in a complex 
society. He defends liberal values of non-conformism and minority rights, while 
insisting on the necessity to rationally shape society by adequate institutions and 
infrastructures, even if they limit individual freedom of some and, therefore, will be 
fiercely contested. But – as POLANYI (2001[1944], p. 265) was well aware - only 
“regulation and control can achieve freedom not only for the few, but for all”. Rigid 
capital control and the abolishment of global financial markets are the single most 
important pre-requisites for civilizing capitalism. Only curtailing finance capital 
and disempowering the rentiers have made Keynesian reforms after 1945 possible. 
Restricting global monetary flows will contribute to levelling the playing field, 
limiting the chance of non-democratic loopholes and opening space for political 
agency at different scales. 
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Of key importance for the implementation of an inclusive and sustainable 
civilization is a fiscal policy which taxes the huge “unearned” rents obtained by 
inheritance, land, wealth and real estate. The power of “plutocracy” (MILANOVIC, 
2016) has to be limited. Furthermore, existing infrastructures which sustain a 
fossil-fuel based mode of living (motorways, airports, oil refineries, etc.) have to be 
deconstructed or revitalized for a social-ecological infrastructure which drastically 
reduces the ecological footprint. The conversion of fossil-fuel based industries – like 
the car industry and agribusiness – has to be initiated. This will result in conflicts 
in situ: To facilitate cycling and walking, limits on cars have to be implemented. To 
stop subsidizing the car industry will result in the joint opposition of car maker and 
their trade unions. To foster regional and organic agricultural systems, true costs of 
transportation have to limit long-distance competition by monocultures.
The outcome of these conflicts is open. A civilization for all does not call for 
central planning or wholesale nationalization, but makes a plea for a mixed economy, 
a hybrid and pluralist economic system (HODGSON, 1999), as a cornerstone of 
a search and learning movement (SOMMER; WELZER, 2014) and participatory 
types of planning. A mixed economy assumes that markets, reciprocity, redistribution, 
householding and other institutional arrangements have their respective strengths in 
organizing the livelihood (POLANYI, 1977). It is the key learning from Polanyi s´ 
critique of the liberal utopia, that avoiding universal markets and the respective 
monopolies and power concentrations are a prerequisite for effective policies of place-
based actors in their local niches, substituting the homogenizing, centralizing and 
uniformising traces of neoliberal globalization. Building alternatives from below will 
avoid any totalitarian temptations, as context-sensitive policies will neither lead to a 
uniform, “politically correct” way of life nor can they be implemented from above. 
They have to be built collectively, adapted to the specific socio-cultural institutions 
and available infrastructures. This is foremost a cultural challenge of redefining our 
planetary responsibility as a dialectical process of strengthening democracy from 
below, giving voice to majorities while respecting diversity and bio-physical limits. 
Given the unsustainability of a productivist and consumerist development 
model, neither exclusion of the many nor mere redistribution of the given guarantees 
a good life for all. Universal flourishing will only be possible with a new, more 
relational understanding of the good life – thereby initiating the “metamorphosis” 
of capitalism as a social revolution (SINGER, 1998). A sustainable and inclusive 
civilization is incompatible with consumerism as the illusion that all needs can 
be satisfied via commodities. Organizing the good life for all via access to mass 
consumption has been a tempting, ecologically increasingly inviable strategy for 
reformist movements. But it has always had disastrous cultural consequences, as it 
reinforced individualism and materialism – thereby undermining the cultural project 
of building a civilization based on “being” instead of “having” (FROMM, 2001). 
However, there is ample evidence that the good life is about fulfilling relations to 
people and objects, being secure and healthy, having friends and being allowed to 
be creative, in short: “resonance” (ROSA, 2016). The good life is about the equal 
right to belong and to be different. Without a blueprint for a reasonable, flourishing 
and frugal life, institutionalized collective learning has to experiment with satisfying 
the needs of “homo reciprocans” (ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 271) like respect, 
friendship, existential security and fulfilling work. 
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Such resonant and resilient communal initiatives must not remain in niches; 
they can offer an attractive form of life to organize the common as participation, 
mutual understanding and shared spaces, be it by celebrations, sporting events, 
demonstrations or meetings. The utopia of a resilient and good life for all can inspire 
communal ownership of energy production and distribution, free or at least cheap 
public transport and decentralized cultural facilities as well as diversity-sensitive 
and affordable care, education and housing. It can valorize different types of work – 
from a paid job to householding and subsistence. And it can inspire the struggle for 
decent work and decent pay, be it via a regional living wage or collective bargaining 
- especially in sectors challenged by platform capitalism and huge corporate power, 
like Amazon, Uber and Walmart. These struggles might be able to contribute to an 
alternative hegemony based on “commonality” (ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 277). 
Resistance to a society based on hereditary privilege, extravagance or separatism 
( ROSANVALLON, 2013, p. 298f) might stimulate inclusive and sustainable 
communities, municipalities and regions. Fostering new class- and region-crossing 
alliances in favour of emancipatory regionalization, sub- and supranationally might 
be an effective and resilient strategy to avoid the unleashing of the most ugly sides of 
the dialectics of enlightenment. 
A POST SCRIPT ON THE CURRENT BRAzILIAN 
IMPASSE
Instead of summarizing the argument, this concluding section will aim at 
offering a few hopeful lessons for the current Brazilian situation. In 2002, I published 
A Desordem da Periferia, my rather pessimistic reflection on 500 years of space 
and power in Brazil (NOVY, 2002). It aimed at integrating the dependency and 
regulation approach, by articulating internal and external factors to understand the 
persistence of domination as well as empowering strategies “from below”. 
From 2003 onwards, the Lula government was a timid attempt to overcome 
The Disorder of the Periphery. It aimed at repeating the social democratic experiences 
from the 20th century, including local socialism. And indeed, the first municipal 
experiments in the 1990s had focused on social infrastructure and participatory 
democracy, similar to Red Vienna. Luiza Erundina in São Paulo (1989-1992), Olivio 
Dutra in Porto Alegre (1989-1992) and many others were involved in a severe cultural 
struggle over the right to the city. Brazilian local socialism, as Red Vienna, was about 
strategies “for all”. But it was still a strategy of double transformation: inclusion in 
the system and transformation of the system (NOVY, 2002).
From 2003 onwards, national policies increasingly abandoned the revolutionary 
long-term aspirations. While institution and infrastructure building encountered 
severe opposition – the struggle about public transport being emblematic – amplifying 
mass consumption was embraced by all coalition partners. Differently from social 
democratic experiences in Europe in the 20th century, decommodification was 
implemented only in an incipient way in Brazil (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 1990). But 
participating in consumer society fosters individualism and the illusion of a money-
centred approach to the good life. Only from 2013 onwards, the pressure “from 
below” to improve the social infrastructure – schools, hospitals and public transport 
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padrão FIFA – was articulated more systematically. It is tragic that this popular 
uprising was the entry point for the Brazilian elite to undermine the timid attempt 
at overcoming the slave owner legacy by creating a “Brazil for all”. Similar to Red 
Vienna, popular and intellectual support for president Dilma faded exactly when the 
reactionary forces became increasingly radical. In Brazil in 2016, as in Vienna in 1934, 
an unfeasible coalition of right-wing, liberal and reactionary forces reimposed order, 
that means a society based on clear, natural hierarchies. Domestic workers with social 
rights, descendants of slaves at universities and women governing the country – these 
cultural revolutions were aborted with clear resemblance to Red Vienna. However, 
Red Vienna could not be destroyed definitively and has inspired inclusive urban 
development until today. Therefore, the incipient steps towards social citizenship in 
Brazil, the multiple examples of building socio-ecological infrastructures from below 
might become – in the near or not so near future - recognized as pioneers of a social 
order that finally enables the equal freedom to all its inhabitants.
The illegitimate deposition of president Dilma Rousseff puts the defense of 
democracy, the rule of law and the incipient welfare state at centre stage. As in the 
fight against fascism in the 1930s and against right-wing populism in current Europe, 
broad alliances have to be built for this minimalist strategy. Hand in hand, however, 
more controversial measures have to be implemented, like rigid capital control and 
massive devaluation to raise import prices, especially for luxury products and tourism. 
As Roosevelt proved in 1933, changing the monetary regime is a prerequisite for 
reconstructing the national productive system. Furthermore, creativity and courage will 
be necessary to overcome the obstruction of substantial reforms, be it a tax reform or a 
reform of the political system. Reformist industrial policies must not repeat the mistakes 
of subsidizing unaccountable private national champions, but have to encourage small 
and medium-sized enterprises as well as public firms. With respect to the welfare 
regime, public infrastructure, public education, public health as well as flourishing 
urban public spaces have to form the backbone of commonality and citizenship. From 
the bottom-up, deliberate strategies of building social-ecological infrastructures have to 
be at the centre of new local coalitions. There is a rich pool of examples in Brazil: the 
cultural struggles over mobility policies in São Paulo under Fernando Haddad (213-
2016); solidarity economy, interpreted as a social revolution by Paul Singer (1998), and 
the landless movement´ s strategy to link middle-class interests for regional and organic 
food with family agriculture and regional cooperatives. These, and many other place-
based experiments together with territorial strategies of limiting market power and 
deepening participatory democracy offer the potential for an emancipatory hegemonic 
strategy in Brazil, representing concrete examples of a double transformation to create 
um Brasil para todos in a planetary civilization for all. 
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